4. WAR AS A NETWORK ENTERPRISE:

THE NEW SECURITY TERRAIN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

 

Professor Mark Duffield

Institute for Politics and International Studies

University of Leeds

While the recent terrorist attacks on America have had a profound social and political impact, it would be wrong to suggest that they mark a wholly new or unexpected departure.   What we are witnessing is a significant consolidation of systems and inter-connections that have been slowly maturing for several decades.  The violence of 11th September was an historic moment that quickly pulled together many existing threads to reveal a fuller sense of the design.  It is now easier to appreciate the consolidation of a new security terrain shaped by the advent of network war.  Like the Cold War before it, network war now defines the global predicament.  Across this contested landscape, bounded by the opportunities and threats afforded by globalisation, new forms of autonomy, resistance and organised violence engage equally singular systems of international regulation, humanitarian intervention and social reconstruction.  Increasingly, what one could call the them and us components of this new security terrain, that is, those systems of resistance and their opposing forces of regulation and intervention, have to varying degrees both assumed a networked and non-territorial appearance.  While states and their security apparatuses remain pivotal, in both camps they situate themselves within and operate through complex governance networks composed of non-state and private actors.  

Across the conflict zones of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, asymmetric forms of autonomy and organised violence have emerged that, through the shadow networks of transborder trade and the cultural and political flows of migrants and uprooted peoples, fully exploit the opportunities of the global/informational economy.  In opposition, we have an expanding international security regime that operates through various forms of public-private networking.  Its most widespread manifestation is in the networks of aid practice.  New contractual regimes, strategic frameworks and public-private compacts now variously inter-connect leading states, NGOs, UN agencies and the business sector (Duffield 2001a) .   

Over much of the South, such networks are busy trying to provide humanitarian assistance, reduce vulnerability, resolve conflict and strengthen the capacities of civil actors: aid has become a technology of security.  In some unstable regions, however, the securitisation of aid is insufficient.  Since the Gulf War, there has also been an expansion and deepening of the civilian-military interface.  The modern way of war not only requires the political and material support of coalitions of the willing, containing and managing its inevitable humanitarian consequences has necessitated a growing interdependence between military establishments and the aid community (Williams 1998) .  While remaining a contested relationship, humanitarian war is essentially a public-private initiative.

 

The Network Enterprise

The way societies are economically, socially and politically organised has historically both shaped and been influenced by the conduct of war.  The formation of the nation-state, colonial expansion and the advent of industrial mass production, for example, were intimately connected with the changing nature of organised violence (Held et al. 1999: 93-95) .  Network war is similarly associated with contemporary shifts in the nature of social life.  In this case, changes in the organisational structure of capitalism, the new phase of globalisation and the reworking of the architecture of the state, especially its repositioning within wider governance networks of non-state actors.    

In the mid 1990s, Manuel Castells described the network enterprise as the generic institutional expression of the new global/informational economy (1996: 151-200) .  Its emergence reflected a shift from standardised industrial mass production to post-industrial systems of flexible manufacturing.  As a way of reducing uncertainty, and keeping the spiralling costs of R&D and market entry under control, flexible production is associated with various models of inter-firm networking.  This includes the intertwining of large corporations into strategic alliances.  In the move to post-industrial forms of organisation, the traditional vertical corporation has given way to the modern horizontal corporation operating within global business networks.  Such horizontal networks are not oligopolistic.  Rather, they are interconnected sets of decentralised components having significant autonomy, often including the ability to compete within a shared strategy.   

There are a number of different approaches for forming horizontal corporations.   According to Castells, among the most advanced are cross-border networks (Ibid: 165).  While separate companies relate to specific markets, they exchange information with other firms in different sectors or locations. Such networks are not concerned with taking territorial control of markets but constructing flexible relations between sets of information-sharing companies in different institutional or spatial environments.  In this way, ...the actual operating unit becomes the business project, enacted by a network, rather than individual companies or formal groupings of companies (Ibid : 165).  Information flows are vital to the success of the business project.  The complexity of the strategic alliances and subcontracting involved, the needs of decentralised decision making, together with the requirements of flexible strategy design, all demand an endless stream of appropriate information.  In this respect while not essential to its existence the development of computers, the internet and information technology have played a formative role in the emergence of the network enterprise.  

The components within a given network are different systems of autonomous goals.  The means within a particular network are located at the points of intersection, or nodes, where different components overlap.  Apart from being autonomous, the components within a given enterprise can also be part of other networks.  Rather than being dependent upon a fixed set of means, depending upon the project, the relation between components and nodes within a network enterprise are continually changing.  They are relational and information-based complex adaptive systems whose performance depends on their degree of connectivity and consistency (see Dillon and Reid 2001) .  Connectivity concerns the ability to facilitate communication between components and is a measure of efficiency.  According to Metcalfes Law[1] the power of a network is equal to the square of the number of nodes that it contains: an enterprise with ten nodes or intersections is not ten times stronger but a hundred times more effective than an enterprise with just one.  Consistency concerns the extent to which there is a sharing of goals across the network and its components.  It relates to the unifying vision that enables the autonomous and even competing components of the same project to pull in one direction. 


Imitation and Uneven Adaptation  

As a generic organizational form, the network enterprise extends beyond the global/informational economy networks have become the new morphology of social life.  What constitutes the nodes of a system vary according to the concrete networks involved.  Regarding the business project, for example, they can include producers, retailers and advertising companies.  In the cultural field, they could be TV networks, entertainment studios and media outlets.  In relation to the new wars, nodes might involve poppy fields, secret landing strips, money laundering institutions and shadow arms dealers.  Network society represents the pre-eminence of social morphology over social action (Castells 1996: 469).  The logic of networking modifies production, experience, power and culture as it expands across transborder social and political space.  The presence or absence of a component within a network, and the status of the network involved, is now a decisive marker of authority and success.   

Regarding the new security terrain, its morphology is constructed from the oppositional engagement of them and us adaptations of the generic form of the global/informational economy: the network enterprise.  Excepting wars of colonial conquest, it is common for opposing security complexes to have an organisational affinity.  Historically, organised violence has been a powerful axis of reordering and imitation.  In his perceptive analysis of the emergence of the modern way of war, especially the contagious and levelling effect on states of a prolonged exposure to asymmetric violence, Martin Van Creveld has argued that, opposing sides who were originally very dissimilar will come to resemble each other first in the methods they use and then, gradually, other respects (1991: 195) .  The oppositional adaptation and transformation of war into a network enterprise, however, is neither straightforward nor uniform.  While there has been a general trend toward networking, the them and us aspects of the new wars have developed the power of the network differentially and unevenly.   

Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, illustrates the problematic nature of imitation in describing his vision of how the present international anti-terrorist coalition should work.  He suggests that unlike the past, it will not be a grand alliance formed for a single purpose.  Instead,    

it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve.  Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways.  Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military.  Some will help us publicly, while others because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly.  In this war, the mission will define the coalition not the other way around (Rumsfeld 2001) .  

This statement is both surprising and ironic.  In describing the desired morphology of the coalition, Rumsfeld also sketches the horizontal corporation and the theory of the business project in which means change to fit the goal.    Rumsfeld is reputed to be an establishment supporter of the contested Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) (Borger 2001b) that advocates a network-centric approach to US military organisation (see Dillon and Reid 2001) .  It is understandable therefore, that he should use a network model to provide a vision for a political coalition.  More interestingly, however, if one substitutes terrorist cells for countries, what Rumsfeld is also describing is how networked systems such as al-Qaida (Meek 2001) or the Algeria spawned Armed Islamic Group (GIA) appear to work (Lia and Kjk 2001) .  Moreover, whereas Rumsfeld depicts the networked anti-terrorist coalition as a goal to be achieved, the evidence suggests that such groups,[2] together with so-called war economies (Le Billon 2000) and international criminal syndicates,[3] have been operating in this manner for some years if not decades.  Indeed, one can suggest that, if anything, they have adapted and developed the power of the network more effectively than us: while we have technical superiority, they may well have the organisational edge.  This issue of uneven development is revisited in the conclusion.     

 

A Shared Predicament or the Failure of Modernity?  

The most common response to the new wars is to interpret them as a failure of modernity.[4]  There are many examples of this alleged failure: the exclusion of the South from global capitalism and, as a consequence, the deepening of poverty; the wrong type of top down development; weak or corrupt public institutions; the unintended and harmful effects of humanitarian assistance, and so on (eg. IDC 1999) .  Commentators usually represent such failure is terms of a loosening of the civilising grip of social organisation, allowing violent forces of barbarity, greed and social breakdown to gain the upper hand (eg. Anderson 1996; Collier 2000) .   

Conflict as a failure of modernity feeds the common perception among aid agencies of war as a form of social regression that destroys development gains (International Alert 1999).  The perspective adopted here, however, is different.  While not doubting the reality of organised violence, by examining the new security terrain in terms of its morphological characteristics rather than its behavioural attributes, it is possible to come to a contrary position.  The transnational wars in places like Afghanistan, Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rather than a failure of modernity can be understood as a realisation of its inner potential and surprising capacities.[5]   

Instead of seeing network war as part of a shared predicament that unities both camps, criminalised elite and failed state representations create a them and us division and subordinate the former to the latter; a process that invariably takes on a cultural, civilisational or behavioural dimension.  Typically, the barbarity, excess and social regression of their wars is contrasted with our violence that, in the form of humanitarian war, is experienced as essentially civilising, marked by restraint and geared to social reconstruction.  Rather than a separation however, in organisational terms at least, we share a security terrain in which the capacities and opportunities of modernity simultaneously creates the possibility for resistive forms of organised violence as well as opposing systems of external regulation and intervention: while we have different versions of the truth, we share the same political space.  

The tendency to divide and subordinate the components of a shared organisational terrain on behavioural grounds, while important for mobilising the public-private networks of liberal power, has repeatedly proven to be a strategic liability: it tends to underestimate and misunderstands the powers of adaptation and longevity of the resistance it confronts.  The Afghan crisis is but one example.  Not only did Western intelligence underestimate the danger posed by the al-Qaida network, in the initial phases of the Afghanistan campaign, it was widely believed that as a failed state even the threat of military action would cause the Taliban to disintegrate.  


The Power of the Network   

The complex adaptive systems associated with the new wars have been exploiting the flexible and relational power of the network for some years. 

Expanding Beyond State Sponsorship  

As part of maintaining the Cold War balance of power, in the past southern insurgency, conflict and international terrorism attracted significant superpower support and material sponsorship.  Between the mid 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, most of that support disappeared.  Rather than a peace dividend however, conflict and terrorist violence has continued.  The decline in state sponsorship has meant that warring parties have had to adapt and, to varying degrees, become self-provisioning.  The growing literature on war economies[6] and the new terrorism[7] details how, by exploiting the adaptive power of the network, violent actors have effectively compensated for the decline in state sponsorship.   

War economies, for example, have linked local resources, such as alluvial diamonds and tropical hardwoods, or the derivatives of coca and poppy production, both illegally and legally to global markets.  They have also established transborder nodal connections with the grey world of the arms trade, money laundering and international criminal syndicates.  Besides illegal trade, warring parties and terrorist groups have also established legal businesses.  In Africa the al-Qaida network, for example, has run companies operating in the fields of import-export, currency trading, civil engineering and agriculture and fisheries (Borger 2001a) .  As systems of autonomous goals, war economies and terrorist networks can also interconnect.  Hezbollah and al-Qaida have had connections with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) controlled illicit diamond trade in Sierra Leone since at least 1998, in the case of Hezbollah the connection is possibly older (Farah 2001) .   

All of these networks have penetrated international financial markets and shown themselves adept at exploiting the loopholes and dubious business ethics of the global economy.  Extrapolating from the work of Ulrich Beck (Beck 1992 [1986]) , rather than a failure of modernity, this relational and resistive power is better understood as an ambivalent and violent form of reflexive modernity.[8]   

According to Metcalfes Law, the power of a network is proportional to the square of its nodal connections.  What we call war economies, terrorist networks and criminal syndicates have increasingly become interconnected, not only among themselves, with legitimate businesses and established systems as well.[9]  This has created the possibility of organised violence as a non-territorial network enterprise having astonishing powers of adaptation and endurance.   Like a living organism, if you change its environment, in order to survive it will mutate even to the extent of becoming a different life form altogether.[10]  By diversifying beyond state sponsorship through strengthening their self-provisioning capabilities, warring parties and terrorist networks have become more effective.  In Angola, for example, having diversified into illicit diamond mining and established nodal connections with the grey world of the arms trade, between 1992/93 UNITAs so-called war of the cities besides uprooting several million people, killed around 100,000  almost the same number as during the preceding 16 years of conflict (Africa Confidential 1993) .  That America and its allies the most powerful military nations on earth are presently ranged against Afghanistan on some registers one of the poorest and most underdeveloped testifies to the power of war as a network enterprise.    

Longevity and Radical Non-Territoriality  

Complex adaptive systems have great powers of survivability.  In Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, it is now common to encounter conflicts that in various forms have been running for two or three decades.  In the past, using legal instruments, states formally declared war and peace; the new wars lack this agency and refinement.  In many unstable zones, they are relative concepts, often simply variations in the intensity and location of insecurity.  The forms of governance associated with organised violence, once the monopoly of states, have expanded to become complex networked systems of state and non-state actors.  The modalities of organised violence both theirs and largely ours have been privatised.   

The widening of inputs and agendas in relation to organised violence, together with the range of calculations that states now have to make, has increased the problems and difficulties in securing closure.  At the same time, the privatisation of violence adds its own dynamic.   

War as a reflexive and network enterprise does not follow the traditional state-based pattern of escalation, stalemate and decline; one cannot assume that exhaustion will occur in transnational wars.  Access to external aid and global markets through the shadow economy, together with international recruits from refugee or migrant diasporas, or regional powers replenishing supplies in their search for advantage, all problematise the possibility of closure (Rubin et al. :23) .  During each phase of adaptation, rejuvenating local-global connections form and attract new regional and international components.  In Angola, for example, since the 1960s, UNITA has transformed itself several times.  From receiving Cold War support from the USA and South Africa across the Namibian border, its growing autonomy during the 1990s through control of diamond fields has seen it move through a changing pattern of regional alignments.  In its latest form, besides the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNITA has been attracting fresh political dynamism from the growing involvement of Zambian interests (Shaw 2000) .  

Despite the changing identities of protagonists and their allies, war has been more or less continuous in Afghanistan for the last twenty years.  Besides helping develop the transregional shadow economy, these interconnected series of conflicts have been very effective in developing transnational political support networks and exploiting their power.  During the 1980s, disaffected activists from across the Muslim world came to Afghanistan to fight Soviet occupation.  Following the Soviet withdrawal, this radicalising experience and the connections established among so-called Afghan Arabs, gave a major boost to the spread and deepening of Islamist political and oppositional networks, including al-Qaida, during the 1990s (Lia and Kjk 2001) .[11]   

It also contributed the growing radicalisation and Islamisation of sanctuary/home country connections among Muslim refugee and disapora communities in the West.   

Rather that a national party, the Taliban is better understood as a transnational enterprise.  It emerged out of the rural religious schools in southern Afghanistan and neighbouring Pashtun populated areas of Pakistan.  Its consolidation after 1994 has been assisted by the continued international support of disaffected Muslim activists and religious networks.  A significant proportion of Taliban fighters, for example, originate from Pakistan and Arab countries (Rubin et al.  2001) .  The al-Qaida network has sponsored many of these.  Given this history, the present phase of the conflict (claimed by the allies to be an entirely new type of war) appears to be reproducing a familiar cycle of events.  The allied military campaign and efforts to bring Muslim leaders into an anti-terrorist coalition has again stimulated political divisions and resentment within the countries concerned.  This has led to a fresh round of disaffection that is drawing in new external players.  Afghanistan is once more a potent node of oppositional radicalisation and rejuvenation.  Reflecting the radical non-territoriality of network war, the first British causalities where not military personnel but, allegedly, British Muslims from Luton fighting for the Taliban (Harris et al. 2001) .  Whatever the outcome of the present campaign, experience suggests that the rejuvenation of networked Islamist resistance, together with widespread southern disaffection, will be one of them.    

 

The Ambivalence of Network War  

Seeing conflict as a failure of modernity is usually associated with forms of analysis that understand the local dynamics of organised violence by separating and contrasting the interests of elites and non-elites (DFID 2001; IDC 1999) .  The necessity of self-provisioning, for example, is interpreted as the actions of greedy, criminalised rulers that secure their own future at the expense of the development opportunities of everyone else (Collier 2000) .  In this authoritarian model, elites enforce a destructive form of rule at the expense of subjugated and vulnerable non-elites (that consequently need international help).  The ethnography of organised violence, however, does not reveal such an unequivocal picture.[12]   

If network war divides into winners and losers, the division is not horizontal as the authoritarian model suggests it is vertical: the complexity of war as a network enterprise is that it pitches entire social systems and their components against each other.  This includes their shadow economies, diaspora communities, cultural networks and political alliances; each with its own mix and levels of elite/non-elite, rich/poor and male/female dynamics.  Moreover, such conflict between social systems not only includes spatially contiguous national or regional networks, the new security terrain also enmeshes our non-territorial systems of regulation and intervention.  

Networks are as much social and cultural manifestations as they are political and economic (Roitman 2001) .  Each of the components and nodes in a networked system, such as those associated with reflexive forms of resistance and organised violence, are sites where new identities emerge, roles are reinvented, and novel forms of social legitimacy become established.  Regarding our wars, since development has undergone its own rejuvenation in terms of being rediscovered as a strategic tool of conflict resolution and social reconstruction (OECD 1998) , development workers have been transformed into security actors.  As military establishments have found themselves engaged in humanitarian wars, they have also had to develop the corresponding deportment.  This social and cultural aspect of networks, especially their ability to change identities and produce new forms of mobilisation and legitimacy, underpins the moral and political ambivalence of war as a network enterprise.  

Ambivalence has both indirect and direct modalities.  Regarding the former, in the process of making local-global connections, the networks associated with reflexive resistance establish long transregional chains and circuits.  Self-provisioning political systems, through encouraging diamond mining, cutting hardwoods, growing poppy and coca, and so on, have given small producers an income in excess of legitimate enterprise (Goodhand 1999) .  The transregional networks and nodal points associated with such shadow trade, including the import of necessary supplies, requires armies of drivers, mechanics, guards, porters and fixers (Nordstrom 2001) .  At truck stops and cross-roads, the shadow economy has revitalised old markets and created new ones through demands for local goods and all types of services (De Boeck 1998) .  At airports, docks, border crossings and capital cities, legions of customs officers, police and ministerial officials are needed to provide forged documentation, disguise origins and falsify destinations. 

The transborder networks associated with organised violence have stimulated enterprise across large tracks of the South.  This is not the activity of greedy elites, but the economy of everyday life.  Ambivalence resides in the ability of such inter-connected networks to support organised violence in one locality while providing employment and the means of life in another.   

In the aid world, conflict is often seen as destroying development.  Borrowing from Rudolph Bahro (1978) , one could argue the contrary.  That is, the transborder networks that support organised violence in one location have encouraged autonomous and resistant processes of actually existing development in other areas.   

Actually existing development has arisen in the spaces and lacuna created by structural adjustment and globalisation: processes that have downsized public bureaucracies reduced formal employment and rendered many local commodities and trades unprofitable or redundant.  Actual development is not the result of official development efforts: it exists despite them.     

A more direct form of ambivalence can be seen in the tragic duality of ethnic cleansing.  While devastating for its victims, that group or cause in whose name the cleansing is undertaken often view its perpetrators as heroes, as righting wrongs and protecting the essentials of life itself.  Grievance provides organised violence with its constituency of support.  The ambivalence of many in the South toward the events of 11th September is a reflection of this.  Violent actors like Chechen warlords (Lieven 1998) or movements such as Hezbollah, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and al-Qaida (Lia and Kjk 2001) not only articulate grievance, they often attempt to provide followers with protection and basic welfare.  This ranges from providing employment, physical security and pensioning the families of martyrs, to building schools, hospitals and mosques: from such actions springs legitimacy.  As van Creveld has pointed out, a political community that is willing to exert itself to protect its members will be able to call on those members loyalty even to the point where they are prepared to die for it (1991: 198) .   

 

Conclusion: Breaking the Cycle or a New Cold War?  

To a certain extent, the sponsorship of organised violence by leading states during the Cold War gave them a degree of political influence among beneficiary movements and parties.  Growing autonomy through networking and self-provisioning has reduced that influence. 

At the same time, human intelligence together with an appreciation of place and history has also declined (Duffield 2001b) .  The shifting geo-political calculations and priorities of the 1990s have reinforced these changes.  Increasing autonomy in the face declining influence and intelligence goes to the heart of the current crisis.  While the new security terrain in general is characterised by the trend toward networking, if anything, they are more advanced than us in exploiting its organisational power.  One has to consider the possibility that while we have technological superiority, they may have the organisational edge.  

One can offer a number of tentative reasons for this uneven and differential adaptation.  Of least importance and speaking relatively, resistant and oppositional forms lack the institutional inertia and bureaucratic baggage of metropolitan systems.  It is perhaps easier for them to adapt and exploit the power of the network within the context of the new opportunities afforded by globalisation.  At the same time, however, while governments, aid agencies, private companies and military establishments embrace the logic of networking, possible metropolitan gains are checked by a pervasive counter trend.  That is, the historic tendency for liberal governance, when faced with rhizomatic and anti-institutional forms of resistance, to dismiss and demonise such opposition, at the same time as supporting strategies of centralisation[13] and the restoration of hierarchical political organisation (Blaug 2000) .   

Some of the attributes of restoration have already been outlined: the tendency to see the new wars as a failure of modernity requiring reform and intervention and the popularity of behavioural them and us explanatory frameworks that are bereft of ambivalence.  Many politicians, including Tony Blair, are aware of the link between the political problems in the Middle East and the present crisis.  There is a concern, however, that the international anti-terrorist coalition, in its willingness to overlook past misgivings for the sake of alliance, has a familiar feel to it.  Rather than the network enterprise envisaged by Donald Rumsfeld, where means change to suit the goal, we could be seeing the foundations of a new Cold War.  This time, given the radical non-territoriality of network war, which also embraces the racial dynamics of metropolitan society, a deepening securitisation of everyday life would seem inevitable.   

Network war has great powers of adaptability and longevity, and grievance is an important factor in its rejuvenation.  Preventing conflicts becoming nodes of radicalisation requires a serious political effort to tackle the national and, importantly, the transnational disaffection that keeps it going.  In this respect, Afghanistan is but part of a wider picture.  Even here, however, the task is daunting.  Attention would need to be focussed on the metropolitan racial divide; the Balkans; the governance of Arab states; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; Kashmir; and so on: issues that form part of  ...the greater west Asian crisis (Halliday 2001) .  At the same time, justice is also required.  However, the rush by America to define the September attacks as acts of war rather than a criminal conspiracy, while reflecting its opposition to an International Criminal Court, has locked the alliance into a course of action seemingly designed to reproduce the terrorism it claims to be against (Ralph 2001) .   

Creating legitimacy by taking political grievance seriously, meeting humanitarian needs, coupled with collecting criminal evidence and the trial in an international court of those involved in the September atrocities, while lacking political theatre, may ultimately be a better way of addressing the growth of private organised violence.  Given the political and economic resources this would require, together with the patience and, not least, the willingness to question established beliefs, including our own, the present military campaign looks, unfortunately, a much easier option.   

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[1] Bob Metcalfe inventor of the Ethernet and pioneer of the networking age (see Dillon and Reid, 2001).

[2] The recent trials of GIA and al-Qaida cell members in Europe and the US has provided much useful information (Lia and Kjk 2001}.  For an analysis of the transcripts of evidence given in New York relating to the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 see http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm.

[3] Castells has argued that in organisational terms, international criminal networks are similar to the most advanced sectors of capitalist economy (1998: 166-205) .

[4] The failure of modernity is a recurrent theme in liberal governance (see Bauman 2001: 230-256) .

[5] For a similar argument in relation to the Holocaust (see Bauman 2001: 230-256) .

[6] See Keen 1998; Duffield 1998; Kaldor 1999; Berdal and Malone 2000; Cilliers 2000; Le Billon 2000 .

[7] See Tishkov 1997; Reeve 1999; Laqueur 1999; Bodansky 1999; Andrsen 2001; Lia and Kjk 2001 .

[8] Reflexivity suggests the maturing of modernity as it becomes conscious of itself through recognition of its possibilities, limitations and risks.  In metropolitan societies, where Beck has focused his analysis, reflexive modernisation is expressed in the activities of workers, consumers and protest groups who, on the basis of their predicament, critically interrogate the claims of official science and economic expertise.  It establishes a form of resistive counter-modernity in relation to life-style, consumer boycotts, environmental protests, anti-globalisation campaigns, and so on. 

[9] For a description of the internationalisation of the Russian mafia and the Latin American drug trade see Castells 1998: 166-205 .

[10] For the utility of biological analogies in understanding complexity see Capra 1982 .

[11] During the 1970s and 1980s, Libyan training camps provided a similar radicalising and networking role for African rebel leaders and warlord figures.

[12] See Keen 1994; Richards 1996; Verdery 1996 .

[13] For an analysis of donor-NGO management relations in terms of the centralising tendencies associated with quality control, transparency and performance auditing techniques see Duffield 2001b.

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